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In Nozick’s rendition of the decision situation given in Newcomb’s Paradox dominance
and the principle of maximum expected utility recommend different strategies. While
evidential decision theory (EDT) seems to be split over which principle to apply and
how to interpret the principles in the first place, causal decision theory (CDT) seems to
go for the solution recommended by dominance (“two-boxing”). As a reply to the CDT
proposal by Wolfgang Spohn (2012), who opts for “one-boxing” by employing reflexive
decision graphs, I will draw on the framework of causal knowledge patterns, i.e., Bayes
net causal models (cf. e.g. Pearl 2009), augmented by non-causal knowledge (epistemic
contours), to finally arrive at “one-boxing” – more intuitively and more closely to what
actually is in Nozick’s story. This proposal allows the careful re-examination of all relevant
concepts in the original story – it prompts a re-evaluation of how prediction may be
analyzed, philosophically and formally, and what the decision-maker’s conceptualization
of the situation might look like.
Keywords: evidential vs causal decision theory, Newcomb’s paradox, Bayes nets, causal
models, interventionist account of causation
Decision theory in general examines the rational principles guiding the
decisions that aim at the attainment of one’s goals. Causal decision theory
(CDT) does so by taking one’s act’s consequences into account – rationally
choosing an option must be based on the available knowledge about the
causal relations in the respective situation, so the argument goes. One of
the principles taken to be a measure for rationality is the option of maximiz-
ing the utility of the outcome, i. e., by making the outcome equal or better
than if one had chosen a different alternative for action. Probabilities and
utilities are used to compute an act’s expected utility such that – as em-
phasized in causal decision theory – dependence between acts and outcomes
∗Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (LMU Munich), r.poellinger@lmu.de
1
are understood as of causal (asymmetrical) character – contrary to a merely
evidential theory of decision making (EDT). A second principle of rational-
ity dictates choosing the course of action that is better, regardless of what
the world is like. This principle of dominance seems to be in conflict with
the first-mentioned principle of expected-utility maximization in the curious
case of Newcomb’s paradox.
Newcomb, Nozick, and a problem
Referring back to the physicist William Newcomb, who first formulated this
dilemma for decision theory, Robert Nozick elaborates on – as he calls it
– Newcomb’s problem, in which two principles of rational choice seemingly
conflict each other, at least in numerous renditions in the vast literature on
this topic.1
In Newcomb’s problem some human-like agent plays a game against some
daemon predictor that influences the course of the game upon predicting his
opponent’s move. The agent may choose to take either one or two boxes in
front of him – either box 1 only or box 1 and 2 together. In doing so he has
no knowledge about the contents of the opaque box 1, but he can see one
thousand dollars placed in box 2. If the daemon predicts that the agent will
take only one box (i. e., box 1), he will put one million dollars in the opaque
box 1. The daemon will put nothing in box 1, though, if he foresees the agent
taking both boxes. The prediction is reliable, or as Nozick introduces the
predictor, “[o]ne might tell a longer story, but all this leads you to believe
that almost certainly this being’s prediction about [the agent’s] choice in the
situation to be discussed will be correct.”2 Moreover, the agent has perfect
knowledge of all these features of the decision game he finds himself in.3
The possible outcomes of the game are presented in table 1 where the rows
stand for the agent’s options, the columns partition the world in possible
states, and each cell contains the sum our agent receives upon choosing an
action in some state of the world.
1Cf. (Nozick, 1969) for the original presentation of the paradox and (Weirich, 2008)
for an overview on various suggestions of how to solve the Newcomb case.
2Cf. (Nozick, 1969, p. 114).
3Note that for reasons of simplicity this presentation of the Newcomb game situation
slightly (yet inessentially) differs from the way Nozick originally presents it in (Nozick,
1969).
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prediction: one-boxing prediction: two-boxing
take box 1 $ 1M $ 0
take box 1 and 2 $ 1M + $ 1T $ 1T
Table 1: Possible outcomes in Newcomb’s problem for the options of taking
box 1 only, taking boxes 1 and 2, respectively, and for correct and incorrect
predictions made by the daemon.
Now, what makes Newcomb’s case so problematic is the fact that the choice
of action seems to depend on the choice of the principle one applies in ratio-
nalizing the situation. Two principles seem to be concurring candidates in
reasoning about Newcomb’s problem, which – although unrealistic – seems
to trigger solid intuitions about the decision-theoretic norms to be applied
here.4 The rationales of maximizing expected utility and of choosing domi-
nating options are defined in the following.5
Definition 0.1 (Maximum Expected Utility)
Among those actions available, one should perform an action with maximal
expected utility.
The expected utility EU (A) of an action A yielding the exclusive outcomes
O1, . . . , On with probabilities P (O1), . . . , P (On) and corresponding utilities
U(O1), . . . , U(On) is calculated by the weighted sum
n∑
i=1
P (Oi)× U(Oi).
Definition 0.2 (Dominance)
If there is a partition of world states such that, relative to it, action A weakly
dominates action B, then A should be performed rather than B.
Action A weakly dominates action B for person P iff, for each state of the
world, P either prefers the consequence of A to the consequence of B, or is
indifferent between the two consequences, and for some state of the world, P
prefers the consequence of A to the consequence of B.
4
Nozick himself obviously put the story on the test bench: “I should add that I have
put this problem to a large number of people, both friends and students in class. To
almost everyone it is perfectly clear and obvious what should be done. The difficulty
is that theses people seem to divide almost evenly on the problem, with large numbers
thinking that the opposing half is just being silly.” – cf. (Nozick, 1969, p. 117).
5The following definitions are adapted from (Nozick, 1969, p. 118).
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Let us take ‘reliable’ (as ascribed to the daemon’s faculty of foreseeing
future events) at face value and compute the expected utility for the outcome
of each specific course of the game – the unit of the expected utility being
dollars in our case. Assuming a reliable daemon basically amounts to saying
that the act of taking one or both boxes and the prediction of this very act
are correlated in a way such that acts in states of the world with incorrect
predictions receive a probability of 0, whereas matching acts and predictions
receive the probability of 1. Table 2 shows the expected utilities for all
four thinkable courses of the game with one option clearly to be preferred
over all others: The agent should take only the opaque box and can then
be certain of winning $ 1M, which clearly supercedes the alternatives as
maximum expected utility.
prediction: one-boxing prediction: two-boxing
take box 1 $ 1M $ 0
take box 1 and 2 $ 0 $ 1T
Table 2: Computing expected utilities in the case of a perfectly reliable pre-
diction yields the utility of $ 0 for all cells representing incorrect predictions.
Maximizing this expected utility amounts to choosing only box 1.
Pondering a different approach to maximizing the outcome of the game,
Nozick tweaks the story a little: The predictor did make his prediction
a week ago, and it is now the agent’s turn to make up his mind and take
either only the opaque box 1 or on top of that also the transparent second
box 2, which contains one thousand dollars openly visible to the agent. The
money is already there and will not be taken out of the boxes anymore after
the agent has made a decision. So, regardless of the daemon’s prediction,
adopting the principle of dominance forces the agent to take both boxes – he
will always end up with one thousand dollars more than if he had only taken
one box. Taking both boxes even strictly dominates the act of taking only
one box as can be read off table 1 by comparing an entry in the second line
to the entry in the first line within the same partition of the world’s states.
Obviously, the principle of maximizing expected utilities and the princi-
ple of dominance yield opposing recommendations to the deliberating agent.
While standard evidential decision theory seems to lean towards one-boxing
(taking an agent’s act as a sign of what the prediction must have been),
causal decision theorists clearly position themselves on the side of two-boxing,
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rejecting backward causation and understanding the agent’s deliberate deci-
sion as cutting any connection between act and prediction. This very idea of
cutting links by deliberately producing specific events has been made math-
ematically precise in network models, e. g., as in (Spirtes et al., 2000), and
is most elaborately presented in Judea Pearl’s book Causality (2000): The
concept of causally efficacious control is formally understood as an external
intervention on a certain node in the network, represented as a local surgery
in the graph, and structurally expressed as a transformation of the model.
Causal asymmetry can be mimicked this way. When Pearl, within this in-
terventionist account of causal reasoning, discusses model-internal observed
acts and model-altering actions from outside, he also comes to reflect upon
the conceptual difficulties hidden in Newcomb’s problem:
The confusion between actions and acts has led to Newcomb’s paradox
(Nozick 1969) and other oddities in the so-called evidential decision
theory, which encourages decision makers to take into consideration
the evidence that an action would provide, if enacted. This bizarre the-
ory seems to have loomed from Jeffrey’s influential book The Logic of
Decision (Jeffrey 1965), in which actions are treated as ordinary events
(rather than interventions) and, accordingly, the effects of actions are
obtained through conditionalization rather than through a mechanism-
modifying operation like do(x).6
When Pearl goes on by comparing the maxims of evidential and causal
decision theory, he baldly comments in a footnote:
I purposely avoid the common title “causal decision theory” in order to
suppress even the slightest hint that any alternative, noncausal theory
can be used to guide decisions.7
To reconcile the dominance principle with the expected-utility principle –
and hence to dissolve the paradox in Newcomb’s case – has been the aim of
quite a few proposals, which nevertheless arrive at different conclusions.
Conditionals and causal graphs
In A Theory of Conditionals (1968) Robert Stalnaker suggests a formal
framework for analyzing the truth of counterfactual statements: ‘If A, then
6Cf. (Pearl, 2009, p. 108). Pearl’s do(·)-operator precisely does the job of setting
a variable X to a constant value x, thereby deactivating any causally described relation
between this variable and its parents in the structure.
7Cf. (Pearl, 2009, p. 108, footnote 1).
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B’ is assigned a truth value in accordance with the following informal con-
dition:
Consider a possible world in which A is true, and which otherwise
differs minimally from the actual world. ‘If A, then B’ is true (false)
just in case B is true (false) in that possible world.8
The subjunctive connective ‘>’ is subsequently equipped with the more for-
mal semantical rules
A > B is true in α if B is true in f(A,α) and
A > B is false in α if B is false in f(A,α),
where α is a possible world, the base world, and β = f(A,α) represents
the selected world minimally differing from the actual world in which B
is evaluated (with f being the selection function operating on a suitable
similarity ordering of possible worlds).
Now, in his Letter to David Lewis (1972) Stalnaker suggests a way of
calculating expected utilities in the Newcomb problem that uses probabilities
of counterfactual conditionals instead of standard conditional probabilities.9
The expected utility of some action A would then be computed the following
way:
EU (A) =
n∑
i=1
P (A > Si)× U(A&Si),
where n indicates the number of states S the world is partitioned into, i. e.,
n = 2 for the two possible predictions ‘one-boxing’ (i = 1) and ‘two-boxing’
(i = 2). As Stalnaker argues, the agent’s action does not cause the
daemon’s prediction made in the past, and hence the probability of the
conditional equals the probability of the prediction alone. But this sets all
probability terms in the sum formula above to equal values – the utilities can
just be read off the corresponding cells in table 1. Two-boxing’s expected
utility will always be greater than one-boxing’s expected utility. Following
Robert Stalnaker’s suggestion of interpreting the involved probabilities
causally, the maximization of expected utility and the dominance principle
recommend taking the same action: two-boxing.
8Cf. (Stalnaker, 1968, p. 169).
9Cf. for this and the following (Weirich, 2008, sect. 2.2).
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Applying causal decision theory to Newcomb’s problem has been criti-
cized by many authors – mainly because it yields the recommendation of
taking both boxes, oftentimes dubbed ‘counter-intuitive’, which neverthe-
less remains as the only rationally explained choice given the circumstances
of Newcomb’s problem with decisions screening off acts from any previous
events, as causal decision theorists claim. In his seminal book The Founda-
tions of Causal Decision Theory James Joyce clearly states his position on
the issue:
When the evidential and the causal import of actions diverge [. . . ], the
evidential theory tells decision makers to put the pursuit of good news
ahead of the pursuit of good results. Many philosophers, I among them,
see this as a mistake. Rational agents choose acts on the basis of their
causal efficacy, not their auspiciousness; they act to bring about good
results even when doing so might betoken bad news.10
While, e. g., David Lewis and Brian Skyrms in their accounts mark at-
tainable situations by building causal information into states of the world
and thereby reconcile the above otherwise diverging principles of rational
choice in the recommendation of two-boxing, Ellery Eells in his consid-
erations arrives at the same conclusion without drawing on the notion of
causality. He claims that mere reflection on the available evidence will force
the agent to rationally go for both boxes – even more direct without the re-
course to any causal theory. Quite in this line of reasoning Richard Jeffrey
also eliminates any hint of a causal nexus between the events in Newcomb’s
problem for the sake of a less metaphysically charged analysis. Pondering
the Newcomb case Jeffrey seems to oscillate between one-boxing and two-
boxing to later arrive at the conclusion that the story, presented this way, is
a somehow illegitimate decision problem with the freely deliberating agent
not capable of freeing his decision from being correlated with the predictor’s
prediction.11 Terry Horgan and Paul Horwich take the Newcomb plot
at face value and promote one-boxing, simply because one-boxers ultimately
take more money home, as the story is told. Paul Weirich diagnoses dryly:
“The main rationale for one-boxing is that one-boxers fare better than do
two-boxers. Causal decision theorists respond that Newcomb’s problem is
an unusual case that rewards irrationality. One-boxing is irrational even if
one-boxers prosper.”12
10Cf. (Joyce, 1999, p. 146).
11Cf. e. g. (Joyce, 2007).
12Cf. (Weirich, 2008, sect. 2.5).
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Having developed his ranking theory as a tool for epistemology and causal
analysis,13 Wolfgang Spohn positions himself on the side of causal (vs. ev-
idential) decision theory and had been a strong advocate of two-boxing for
a long time before he started “Reversing 30 Years of Discussion” by pre-
senting an elaborate argumentation “Why Causal Decision Theorists Should
One-Box.”14 Spohn’s primal commitment can be found in the title of his
paper Bayesian nets are all there is to causal dependence (2000). In such
Bayes net causal models (generic) events are encoded as random variables
and graphically represented by single nodes. A node X is connected to its
parents by a set of directed edges, which jointly mark the causal mecha-
nism responsible for bringing about some specific value x (of X). In Judea
Pearl’s framework these mechanisms are defined as deterministic functions
potentially also taking some disturbance variable as an argument to repre-
sent (observational) uncertainty in the model. The Markov compatibility of
the graph and the corresponding probabilistic model can in causal terms be
interpreted as causal Markov condition: Causes screen off their direct effects
particularly from prior influences and more generally from changes in any
other event that is represented as a non-descendant in the graphical rendi-
tion (when the graph encodes precisely the perceived causal independencies
of the modeled situation).
P
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B
P
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B
∗
(i) (ii) (iii)
Figure 1: Wolfgang Spohn discusses the usual manipulated (mutilated)
causal graph (i) employed by causal decision theorists for the analysis of
the Newcomb problem, the decision graph (ii) for the same situation, and
the reflexive decision graph (iii) augmented by the decision node B∗.
13Cf. (Spohn, 2012a).
14The quotations here are taken from the title of Spohn (2012b).
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Now, figure 1 illustrates the golden thread in Spohn’s chain of reasoning in
the Newcomb case. Time evolves from top to bottom in all three Bayes net
diagrams. The left diagram (i) shows the standard rendition used by causal
decision theorists for the analysis of the paradox – this mutilated causal graph
contains the node P representing the daemon’s prediction as the first event
in time before action node B (representing the agent taking one or two
boxes) and the bottom node M (for monetary outcome). The diagram is
mutilated quite in agreement with Pearl’s interventionist framework: The
hypothetical local surgery, i. e., the deliberate intervention on B, prunes any
arrows possibly pointing towards B, thereby freeing this node from the influ-
ence of any other node in the model and making the corresponding variable
an exogenous one. The course of action can now be chosen on the basis of
this decision graph, in which the wiggled variable is graphically represented
by the square node. This rendition follows the two decision-theoretic prin-
ciples highlighted by Spohn in this context: “acts are exogenous” and –
derived from the first – “no probabilities for acts.” Of course, Spohn’s acts
have to be interpreted as Pearl’s actions (i. e., acts in mutilated models).
Whatever the connection between nodes P and B might have been in some
graphical rendition of the original causal relations understood as represent-
ing the Newcomb plot (e. g., with P as a direct cause of B), graph (i) in
figure 1 represents the variables’ dependencies once the agent deliberately
takes action. In Bayes net terms P and B are d-separated (by the collider
in P → M ← B), which makes the choice of taking both boxes rational
– whatever has been put into the boxes (based upon the prediction early
in the game) will not become less by choosing either one or, alternatively,
two boxes (later in the game). Spohn declares himself dissatisfied with this
analysis and brings up the mind-bugging questions about the reliability of
the daemon, again:
What about the remarkable success of the predictor that suggests that
given you one-box it is very likely that she will have predicted that you
will one-box, and likewise for two-boxing? How do [these considera-
tions] enter the picture? They don’t. [Causal decision theorists] do not
deny them, but they take great pains to explain that they are not the
ones to be used in practical deliberation calculating expected utilities;
and they diverge in how exactly to conceive of the subjective probabili-
ties to be used instead.15
If the causal graph contained one more arrow from B to P , making the
agent’s action a direct cause of the daemon’s prediction (as illustrated in
15Cf. (Spohn, 2012b, p. 4).
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figure 1, diagram (ii)), we would inevitably introduce backward causation
into the analysis. Spohn wants to avoid this but interprets graph (ii) as the
decision-guiding pattern which the agent uses to choose between alternative
actions – in Spohn’s terms: the ordinary decision graph for Newcomb’s
problem. How are the causal relations laid out, however? If neither the
prediction causes the agent’s act nor this act causes the daemon’s prediction,
we have to infer the existence of an earlier third event as a common cause of
both P and B – quite in accordance with Reichenbach’s Common Cause
Principle. Spohn’s straightforward suggestion is to understand the decision
situation the agent finds himself in as the common cause in question. This
decision situation B∗ (as introduced into graph (iii) in figure 1) might consist
of all the agent’s beliefs, prior knowledge, or rational principles the agent may
not even be aware of (the daemon is, however) but which he will without
fail employ in deciding about his strategy B when standing before the two
boxes. In particular, B∗ also contains the full ordinary decision-guiding
pattern (ii), which makes graph (iii) a reflexive decision graph containing a
reduced version of itself.16 Making this move, Spohn openly rejects the “acts
are exogenous” principle. An agent’s strategic deliberation about alternative
courses of action does not decouple the act from past or future events –
he might, quite on the contrary, make his deliberations depend on (i. e.,
graphically speaking, link them to) predecessor nodes in the diagram. He
might, on top of that, also be aware of the probabilities of different actions
he may choose from, knowing what he usually does or intentionally avoids
in normal cases etc. There might be probabilities for the agent’s act, after
all. Querying Spohn’s reflexive decision graph on the ground of all these
considerations ultimately yields the recommendation of one-boxing – after
reflecting on the current situation (in B∗), the rational agent must come to
the unequivocal conclusion that deciding to one-box and acting accordingly
simply maximizes the utility of his act B.
Let us compare Spohn’s analysis with Pearl’s causal maxims, once
more. The ordinary decision graph (as displayed in figure 1.ii) fully complies
with what Pearl would devise for strategic reasoning, i. e., a graph that
simulates possible outcomes of hypothetical interventions. Setting B tells us
the value ofM . B is an exogenous variable such that the “acts are exogenous”
principle is adhered to – act and action amount to the same consequence
in this case. The evidential and the causal approach perfectly concord in
16
Spohn gives clear rules for the step-wise reduction of a reflexive decision graph to its
ordinary counterpart possibly containing backward links – cf. (Spohn, 2012b, sect. 3).
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this diagram, were it not for the directed backward edge B → P . This is
the reason for the causal decision theorist to think directly in terms of the
mutilated graph (given in figure 1.i) and for Spohn to call diagram 1.ii not
causal but reduced, ordinary decision graph. In the further step of construing
the reflexive decision graph 1.iii, Spohn must reject the “acts are exogenous”
principle and convincingly argues for his case: The hypothetical intervention
on the variable B must not be performed within the reflexive decision graph.
This graph makes explicit what it means for the agent to be rational, i. e.,
he acts on his knowledge, principles, and rational considerations given in
B∗. Pruning the link B∗ → B would make the agent plainly irrational and
ignorant of his own situation, since the deliberation process is pushed into
the model, after all.
Technical answers to questions about how to properly reduce reflexive
decision graphs to their ordinary, structural counterparts can all be found in
Spohn’s explications. Conceptual questions remain, however. Firstly, the
introduction of a common cause for B and P essentially adds to the Newcomb
story the idea of being (perhaps physically determinately) pre-disposed. In
a way, this metaphysically overloads the already artificially construed plot
with another element just by drawing on Reichenbach’s principle of the
common cause. Moreover, it forces Spohn to set apart the agent’s inclina-
tions to take certain actions from the acts themselves. Decision making in the
game is consequently re-interpreted as only discovering one’s previously fixed
inclinations (where discovery is not something brought about actively, e. g.,
such that it would manifest itself in deliberate, hypothetical test interven-
tions, but simply a feature of persistent rationality becoming evident). This
rendition seems very far from the much more intuitive interventionist frame-
work, which merely requires the agent to bear a confined mini laboratory
in his head and turn the knobs therein – knowledge about the mechanisms
will yield unique virtual outcomes and guide decision making. Nevertheless,
Spohn’s complex reflexive decision graph does rest in its core on the very
simple ordinary reduced decision graph (figure 1.ii) to which the whole bur-
den of explanation is shifted. This shall be looked at more closely in the
following. What can be the content of this reduced graph, after all? If the
link B → P is dismissed as a causal relation, of what nature can it be? If
it, on the other hand, does stand for some hidden causal connection and is
dismissed as an instance of backward causation, it must represent a causal
link through some obscure common cause. If this common parent node of
both P and B is the decision situation again – just as in the reflexive graph
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on the meta level – analysis enters an infinite regress at this point. Only
the interventionist approach could prevent this from happening by pruning
B → P , but then this would already apply on the upper level in the reflexive
decision graph and conflict with Spohn’s final conclusion. If the supposed
common cause in figure 1.ii is interpreted as some irreducible obscure past
event or state whose existence just has to be acknowledged and whose link
to B shall not be interrupted, then how would it be possible to perform
hypothetical test interventions on this very node to virtually maximize the
outcome? If reflecting on this graph ultimately comes down to just observing
the propagation of values, then, one has to conclude, Spohn’s suggestion is
constrained to stay within evidential reasoning.
The concepts involved
As in all cases of paradoxical disagreement, the concepts involved should be
explicated as precisely as possible to do away with any source of confusion
and to fix the premises prior to systematic treatment. In the Newcomb case
causation, decision, and prediction take center stage – a closer look at these
concepts is in order. First, causal relations, taken to be directed in accor-
dance with time, shall be understood as encodable and storable in Bayes
net causal models as devised by Spirtes et al. (2000) or Pearl (2009). These
models structure stable and deterministic dependencies as perceived by the
modeler or given in the data (once observational noise is recognized as such).
Pearl’s causal models compactly represent a set of counterfactual situations
by allowing for hypothetical local interventions on certain variables in the
structure – as structured bodies of knowledge they can be used for com-
municative purposes and facilitate explanation, instruction, and prediction.
The decision maker takes all available data into account, he has knowledge
of all causally relevant information, i. e., of the full model with all dependen-
cies. Hypothetical interventions on action variables in the model will yield
predictions about potential outcomes such that decision making is finally
guided by computing and optimizing outcome values (in a maximum util-
ity approach). The prediction (computation) of outcomes by the pondering
agent is to be distinguished from the kind of prediction the daemon performs
as a move within the game situation. In accordance with intuition and our
use of language, the daemon’s miraculous faculty has to do with knowing or
learning things by seeing into the future. This concept of prediction seems
bi-directional, as the content of the prediction and the predicted event stand
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in close relation. Knowing one makes the other inferable.17 It is worth noting
that the accuracy (i. e., the degree of reliability) of the daemon’s prediction
does not decide between the evidential and the causal approach: CDT ar-
gues for 2-boxing on the basis of independence assumptions. And EDT will
prefer 1-boxing over 2-boxing down to the low predictive accuracy of .5005
– close to exchanging prediction for a coin toss. The paradox is much rather
about the principles that guide decision making, the use of language, and
our intuitions about the concepts involved.18 Now, if we actually wanted to
base our strategy on causal knowledge, we arrive at the central question of
this paper: If it does neither seem right to say that the prediction causes the
predicted event nor that the predicted event causes the prediction (through
some backward connection), how could the concept of prediction (as part of
the game situation) be suitably accommodated in a causal model to guide
decision making?
Integrating causal and non-causal knowledge
What is needed for the integration of a prediction link into standard causal
models is the introduction of a new type of edge – a non-directed, non-
causal but rather informational link, capable of propagating information
instantaneously, and moreover not to be deactivated by any means. This
link should work like synonyms, mathematical inter-definitions, or logical
relations (which certainly all belong to the pool of knowledge we use for
decision making). In standard statistical modeling prediction and predicted
event would be collapsed into one single variable (node, respectively). In
philosophical context we would like to disambiguate conceptually, and in the
causal model the temporal distance between prediction and predicted event
should find its expression. Consequently, the final model ought to contain
two distinct nodes and mark these nodes as tightly, functionally dependent.
17In this characterization prediction works much like a quotation relation.
18Some people (even advocates of causal decision theory) argue that it makes a signif-
icant difference if the story is told in deterministic terms (with a fully reliable predictor)
or with indeterministically inaccurate predictions. Nozick (1969) comments critically:
[Do these people] really wish to argue that if [they know] the prediction
will be correct, [they] will take only the second, but that if [they know the
prediction] will be wrong once in every 20 billion cases, [they] will take what
is in both boxes? Could the difference between one in n, and none in n, for
arbitrarily large finite n, make this difference?
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When Judea Pearl writes about the principles of encoding causal depen-
dencies in formal models, he notes:19
The ability to represent functional dependencies would be a powerful ex-
tension from the point of view of the designer. These dependencies may
easily be represented by the introduction of deterministic nodes which
would correspond to the deterministic variables. Graphs which con-
tain deterministic nodes represent more information than d-separation
is able to extract; but a simple extension of d-separation, called D-
separation, is both sound and complete with respect to the input list
under both probabilistic inference and graphoid inference.
Along these lines and in addition to the directed edges representing factors
of causal mechanisms in the graph, we straightforwardly introduce a type of
non-directional, informational link, which shall be called Epistemic Contour
(EC) to underline its intensional nature. For the purpose of this paper we
shall restrict ourselves to introducing a single EC, described by a 1-1 function,
that will be tested only by atomic interventions in the model. Integrating
such an epistemic contour in the causal model turns this into a model of
hybrid knowledge, i. e., a rich structure of directed and undirected relations,
in the following referred to as Causal Knowledge Pattern (CKP).20
Prediction is a matter of knowledge
What the backward link B → P in graph 1.ii can possible mean shall in the
following be made explicit within a very simple causal knowledge pattern,
thereby ideally revealing more about the nature of the paradox and hope-
fully illuminating some more features of how we reason with (non-)causal
knowledge. The CKP in figure 2 traces the story of Newcomb’s problem by
only referring to the events that actually are in the narration. The problem
is not treated by tweaking the story but by choosing a framework fit to ac-
commodate all relevant concepts.
19Cf. Verma and Pearl (1988), where d -separation is introduced as a means to discover
independencies in the graph.
20Since context always disambiguates whether ‘epistemic contour’ or ‘EC’ refers to
the functional description or its graphical representation, I will use the term for either.
One technical remark is in order though: The alert reader will have noticed that the
introduction of an undirected EC in DAG models will in general render those cyclic and
non-Markovian. For the present case this does not pose problems – inference from the
simple CKP proposed below will be computationally straightforward. To make CKPs in
general useful for consistent computation, I elsewhere lay out principles of design and
inference for a CKP framework.
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Figure 2: Newcomb’s problem with the act of taking one or two boxes (B)
tightly connected to the daemon’s reliable prediction (P1) by an epistemic
contour (c) in this causal knowledge pattern.
Our human-like agent deliberates about the situation he finds himself in and
decides what to do (D), namely if he takes one box or both boxes (B). The
daemon predicts what the agent will do (P1) and prepares the boxes accord-
ingly (P2). The monetary outcome (M) should finally reward the rational
agent. Time evolves from top to bottom in the diagram. The vertical posi-
tioning of P2 is inessential for the analysis of the situation (P2 could as well
come after B if the game is set up in a way that the agent only writes down
his choice on a sheet of paper secretly in step B). The daemon’s prediction
together with its reliability is interpreted in this causal knowledge pattern
as an undirected 1-1 relationship. Neither would we say that the agent’s
act genuinely causes the prediction of this very act, nor does it sound right
to say the prediction causes the predicted event.21 But there is more in the
pattern: B is not directly linked to the daemon’s preparation of the boxes P2
– this connection is mediated by the prediction P1, which has direct causal
influence on P2 in turn. This is quite in agreement with Spohn’s analysis
that the causal structure of the Newcomb problem should exhibit some node
prior to both players’ acts in the game which at the same time takes care
of the bidirectional transfer of information. P1 and P2 are separated in the
proposed causal knowledge pattern for this very reason. On the other side, D
(the human-like agent’s decision situation) and B (his concrete move in the
game – either taking one or both boxes) are separated, as well, to disentan-
gle conceptually what it means for the agent to spontaneously and possibly
21Moreover, as is argued here, drawing on Reichenbach’s Common Cause Principle
for an explication of prediction is precisely a source of counter-intuitive inference.
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unforeseenly change his mind. This is a much-discussed issue in the litera-
ture and does pose additional problems if the modeling allows for the agent
changing his mind and the daemon’s prediction referring to the ‘wrong’ de-
cision. Not so in the suggested causal knowledge pattern, which links the
prediction P1 to the agent’s final act B however often he may have made
up or changed his mind before actually taking only one or, after all, both
boxes. In other words, pondering courses of action must focus on B bearing
the whole burden of explanation in the process of finding the best strategy
for the maximization of the outcome. This is precisely how Nozick tells the
story.
The modeling does not draw on the insertion of backward links that would
indicate backward causal flow. Nevertheless, information is transferred back
in time along the epistemic contour c, thereby formally grasping the very
meaning of ‘prediction’. c will not get cut off by any local surgery in the
graph. By suitably applying hypothetical test interventions the following
claims can be read off the causal knowledge pattern – quite in accordance
with intuition:
• The agent’s decision (D) causes his act (B) – in general: any causal
history of (B) naturally influences the agent’s act causally;
• the agent’s decision (D) is also interpreted as causing the daemon’s
peculiar prediction (P1) and thereby also as causing the daemon’s par-
ticular move in the game (P2);
• intuition also conforms with the claim that the agent’s taking one or
two boxes (B) causes his antagonist’s preparation of the boxes – the
predictor reacts to (B), after all;
• nevertheless, the agent’s act (B) does not cause its own peculiar pre-
diction (P1) but determines it uniquely and – looking at the pattern
from above – simultaneously though backwards through time.
Now, especially the last point reveals the core of the paradox and locates
the difficulties in reasoning about the causal relations involved. Any attempt
at solving the artificial plot of Newcomb’s problem hinges on the question
of how to embed the concept of reliably predicting future events into the
formal analysis (if such an analysis is not denied in the first place exactly
because of the fictional character of the narration). The causal knowledge
pattern above presents the prediction as the very thing it is – an image of the
agent’s act. Backward links are excluded from this rendition while query-
ing the pattern does yield indirect causal claims referring back across time.
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This interpretation would of course not stand physically ontologically based
scrutiny, but it conforms with our concepts of prediction (of future events)
and reaction (to facts just learned of). How pieces of knowledge are orga-
nized and information propagated is shown in the causal knowledge pattern
devised here. Obviously, the “acts are exogenous” principle insisted on by
proponents of an interventionist account of causation is relativized in apply-
ing causal knowledge patterns to problems of decision theory. The epistemic
contour c is not deactivated by intervening on B, while the one directed edge
D → B is removed by the external action do(B = b) – quite in Pearl’s sense
B and P1 become “jointly exogenous”. To sort the terms involved here: The
act B becomes exogenous by virtue of the action do(B = b), which is itself
external.22 If the prediction of events is formalized within a model (a causal
knowledge pattern, respectively), foreseeing acts can be made explicit, while
foreseeing actions cannot be given graphical expression. Reflecting on the
Newcomb situation and performing hypothetical manipulations on the basis
of integrating causal and non-causal knowledge finally guides the agent (who
is aware of the setting) towards the correct decision. Resorting to reflexive-
ness is not necessary for virtually maximizing the outcome. The conclusion
must be one-boxing.
As a concluding remark, David Lewis shall be mentioned here once more.
He examines another paradoxical puzzle of strategic thinking and finds in
1979 that the “Prisoners’ Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem”, too.23 The story
in this particular dilemma shall be outlined briefly. Two suspects are caught
by the police, that do not have sufficient evidence for conviction and therefore
question the prisoners separately and (also separately) promise immediate
release if the prisoners betray the respective other prisoner by confessing.
However, if both confess, each serves a sentence of three months – in case
both remain silent, each serves one month. Table 3 summarizes the situ-
ation compactly. If prisoner A applied the principle of dominance to his
situation, he would of course confess, thereby always being off better than
if he remained silent. If both prisoners think alike in this respect, however,
they will be doomed to a sentence of another three months in prison. This is
what makes the situation a strategic dilemma: Attributing the same (degree
of) rationality to both prisoners does not entail the best outcome. If they
include in their deliberations the ascription of like-mindedness to their fel-
22For clarification: exogenous remains a model-internal property of nodes (i. e., vari-
ables, respectively), whereas external marks transformations of causal structures.
23The quotation refers to the title of Lewis (1979).
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low inmate, both of them should remain silent. If this ascription is reliable
enough (or even deterministically certain), e. g., because of some commit-
ment to the same gang code, then the prediction in Newcomb’s problem and
this theoretical simulation (the ascription) in the prisoners’ dilemma essen-
tially amount to the same thing – “[i]nessential trappings aside, Prisoners’
Dilemma is a version of Newcomb’s Problem, quod erat demonstrandum.”24
B stays silent B confesses
A stays silent Each serves 1 m A serves 1 y, B goes free
A confesses A goes free, B serves 1 y Each serves 3 m
Table 3: Each of the prisoners could go free or serve a sentence of one month,
three months, or a year – depending on their strategic decisions.
A common causal knowledge pattern might be used to capture all (non-)
causal relations as in the above rendition of Newcomb’s problem – quite
naturally and without introducing further metaphysical assumptions about
possible background variables. In fact, tilting the time axis in figure 2 by 90
degrees (such that time evolves from left to right) yields the skeleton of the
prisoners’ plot (of course, D and P2 are particular ingredients of Newcomb’s
problem and inessential for the current examination). c is fit to represent
mutual ascription of like-mindedness by both prisoners, who must decide to
cooperate during their simultaneous (but separate) questioning to achieve
the joint best result. May the Newcomb case be some fictional construction,
Lewis makes the case for analyzing the prediction of future events and
the ascription of like-mindedness to one’s antagonist in terms of the same
underlying pattern:
Some have fended off the lessons of Newcomb’s Problem by saying: “Let
us not have, or let us not rely on, any intuitions about what is ratio-
nal in goofball cases so unlike the decision problems of real life.” But
Prisoners’ Dilemmas are deplorably common in real life. They are the
most down-to-earth versions of Newcomb’s Problem now available.25
24Cf. (Lewis, 1979, p. 239).
25This final quotation borrows the concluding paragraph from (Lewis, 1979, p. 240).
I agree with Lewis on the point that situations of strategic deliberations of the kind
exemplified here are “the most down-to-earth versions of Newcomb’s Problem” – because
there is nothing more to know than already said – in contrast to cases of so-called medical
Newcomb problems where research might in most cases yield additional information and
knowledge about true common causes whose influence would indeed be rendered void by
free deliberation/active intervention.
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